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COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE EMERGENCE OF A RULE OF CUSTOMARY INT'L LAW
FROM U.N. RESOLUTIONS
DR. JOSEPH ISANGA*
In response to the global threat of international terrorism and the counter-
terrorism efforts by national governments, the United Nations General Assembly
(G.A.) and the United Nations Security Council (S.C.) have adopted various
resolutions and conventions.' The effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism
could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally agreed definition of
international terrorism. However, the absence of such agreement to date has, inter
alia, thwarted efforts aimed at adopting a comprehensive international, legally-
binding instrument regarding international terrorism. In spite of its urgency and
the critical importance of terrorism to contemporary international relations,
international terrorism has proven not easily amenable to satisfactory or exclusive
regulation by treaty. Notwithstanding the definitional dilemma, the United
Nations' resolutions regarding counter-terrorism have insisted on the necessity to
protect human rights in the context of counter-terrorism.
2
Although the United Nations currently has no agreed-upon definition of
terrorism, this article will argue that it is nonetheless possible to hold States
engaged in counter-terrorism efforts liable for violations of international human
rights law even when they are not signatories to relevant international treaties. The
basis for such an obligation, it will be advocated, derives from various resolutions
of the United Nations and decisions of national courts which represent a step
toward the codification of a general obligation to protect human rights in the
context of counter-terrorism as an emerging rule of customary international law.
The substance of such a rule would provide that no State can legally adopt
. Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. LL.B, Makerere University, Kampala,
Uganda First Class Honors and First-in-Class; LL.M., University of Notre Dame, Summa Cum Laude;
J.S.D. University of Notre Dame, Summa Cum Laude. Teaches International Law, International
Human Rights Law, Jurisprudence, and Law, Ethics & Public Policy.
1. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167;
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXVI), U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(Dec. 17, 1979); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Dec. 15, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999); International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc,
A/RES/59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005).
2. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 146 (XXXVI), supra note 1, at Preamble; G.A. Res. 52/164, supra note 1,
art. 14; G.A. Res. 54/49, supra note 1, art. 17; G.A. Res. 59/290, supra note 1, art. 12.
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strategies aimed at combating international terrorism if those strategies
simultaneously derogate from established international human rights norms. The
practical utility of this discussion would be to put States on notice that counter-
terrorism efforts oblivious of international human rights standards may be in
breach of international law, regardless of the non-existence of an international
treaty regime regulating State practices in this area. In that regard, States could be
legally liable both domestically and internationally.
As will be discussed, a norm of customary international law depends on the
existence of State practices and the engagement in those practices with a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).3  This article will propose that the relevant
international conventions and U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council
paper-trail 4 regarding protection of human rights while combating international
terrorism, as well as on national and international decisions, establishes a sufficient
documentary record of State practice. Similarly, the nature and language of those
resolutions, as well as the respect that national governments have accorded the
decisions of their own national courts in regard to the need to protect human rights
3. See discussion infra Section 1.
4. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/164, supra note 1, art. 5 (requiring that each State adopt measures that
may be necessary including domestic legislation to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of the
Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by consideration of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their
grave nature); G.A. Res. 54/49, supra note I, art. 4; Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 56/160,
6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (Feb. 13, 2002) (calling upon States to "take all necessary and effective
measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including international human
rights standards, to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism ... and ... strengthen, where appropriate,
their legislation to combat terrorism"); Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 57/219, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/219 (Feb. 27, 2003) (affirming that
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under
international law, in particular international human rights"); Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Encountering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/191, U.N. Doc A/RES/59/191
(Mar. 10, 2005); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/195, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/195 (Mar.
22, 2005) (rejecting the "identification of terrorism with any religion"); Threats to International Peace
and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, S.C. Res. 1373, 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001)
(calling on all States to ensure that "terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in
domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts"); S. C. Res. 1535, U.N. Doc S/RES 1535 (Mar. 26, 2004) (stating that States "must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law and
should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human
rights"); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (reiterating much of S.C. Res. 1535);
S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). See also U.N. High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 8, E/CN.4/2006/94 (Feb. 16, 2006) (stating that states have
the right and duty to protect their citizens against terrorist attacks, but state action must be in conformity
with international human rights); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Civil And Political Rights, Including
Religious Intolerance, 103, E/CN.4/2003/66 (Jan. 15, 2003) (submitted by Abdelfattah Amor) (stating
that "non-governmental organizations ... continue to express grave concern that the 'total security'
drive being implemented under cover of anti-terrorist laws . have a direct and immediate impact on
the entire human rights protection system"); Kofi Annan, Sec'y Gen., U.N., Message for Human Rights
Day, Torture, Instrument of Terror, Can Never Be Used To Fight Terror (Aug. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsmI0257.doc.htm.
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while combating international terrorism, would support the case for the existence
of the requisite opiniojuris.
The argument that will be developed is premised not only on the recent cases
of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), but also on the more foundational
I.C.J. cases establishing the circumstances under which codification of
international norms takes place by reference to resolutions of instruments of the
United Nations. In particular, the argument is predicated on the North
Sea/Continental Shelf Case's5 discussion of the codification of customary law from
conventional documents, as well as the I.C.J. decisions in the Case Concerning
Military and Par-Military Activities in and Against Nicaragua,6 Case Concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Congo v. Uganda),7 the Construction
of A Wall Advisory Opinion,8 and the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion9 in their treatment of the legal effect of U.N. resolutions. Additionally,
the article will examine the decisions of several national courts that have ruled
anti-terrorism legislations and practices as being overreaching to the extent these
derogated from human rights standards. Specifically, courts in the United
Kingdom, the United States, and India exemplify this trend, with some of these
tribunals having derived their norms of international law by reference to the
resolutions of international organizations.
This article is divided into four sections. Section I will discuss how a rule of
customary international law generally develops, including discussions of
development from conventional sources and the use of United Nations resolutions
for finding a rule of customary international law generally. Section II will
expound the treatment of and reliance upon the United Nations resolutions as a
source of law by the International Court of Justice, in order to facilitate our
discussion of an emerging rule of customary international law from resolutions.
Section III will consider the limitations for using resolutions as binding statements
of opiniojuris. Finally, section IV will analyze the resolutions of both the General
Assembly and Security Council that are particularly relevant to complying with
human rights while combating terrorism and advocate that such resolutions have
established the necessary opiniojuris and, combined with the decisions of the high
courts of influential countries which abide by the rule, confirms a rule of
customary international law that counter-terrorism measures must conform to
human rights.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A RULE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (C.I.L.)
As this article addresses the emergence of a norm of customary international
law from resolutions, a fundamental explanation of the typical development of
5. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
6. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
7. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2000
I.C.J. I 11 (Nov. 7).
8. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 l.C.J. 136 (July 1).
9. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
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customary international law is in order. The list of sources of international law
under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice'0 includes what
is labeled as "international custom," also known as customary international law."
Customary international law, which has equal authority with conventional laws,
such as treaty law,12 is often relied upon for its important role inproviding a rule of
law in areas of international law in which no widely applicable conventional rule
exists.
A. General Requirements for the Development of a Rule of C.I.L.
Customary international law receives the status of "law" because the I.C.J.
considers custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law" and thus as
"part of the corpus of general international law."' 3 To be accepted as "customary,"
the proponent of an emerging norm must show that States adhere to a practice
demonstrative of such custom and do so with a sense of legal obligation, known as
opinio juris.14 In other words, "[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it.
1 5
The I.C.J. has various approaches to establish the existence of international
custom. In many cases, the I.C.J. is willing to assume the existence of an opinio
juris on the bases of the evidence of a general practice, a consensus in the
literature, or the previous determinations of the Court or other international
tribunals. 16 However, in some cases the Court calls for more positive evidence of
the recognition of the validity of the rules in question in the practice of States.' 7 As
respected international law scholar, Ian Brownlie, points out, the choice of
10. This article is often given preeminence by international legal scholars as the starting point for
sources of international law. See, eg., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5
(6th ed. 2003) (emphasizing that Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute "is generally regarded as a complete
statement of the sources of international law").
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993 [hereinafter LC.J. Statute].
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §102 cmt. j (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations].
13. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(b); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 28 (Feb. 20).
14. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 41-42.
15. Id. at 44.
16. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 8.
17. See, e.g. S.S. "Lotus,' (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7)
(commenting "[e]ven if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases were
sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances alleged by the Agent for the French Government, it
would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings,
and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were
based on their being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international
custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a
duty").
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approach appears to depend upon the nature of the issues - that is, the state of the
law may be a primary point of contention - and the discretion of the Court.IS
B. Development of C.I.L. from a "Conventional" Rule
For rules which develop from purely "conventional" statements of law - i.e.
those arrived at by convention or agreement, such as treaties or charters - before
finding the existence of such rule, the I.C.J. considers: (i) whether the language of
the agreement is norm-creating; (ii) the passage of time since the rule was
embodied in the agreement; and (iii) the consistency of State practice concerning
the rule. 19
As to the first requirement, the I.C.J. has stated that "the provision concerned
should, at all events, potentially be of a fundamentally norm-creating character
such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law., 20 Thus, in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court found that the provision
concerned was not of a "norm-creating character" for several reasons, including
that it was not phrased in the convention as a rule but as a default (to be used
where parties did not agree to their own method), unresolved controversies about
the scope of the provision existed, and the parties were free to accept the
21
convention while making reservations regarding this provision. In other words,
the ability of States to freely derogate from the rule while accepting the remainder
22
of the convention undercut the argument that it had a norm-creating character.
On the passage of time element, the Court held that development of a rule of
customary international law over a brief period of time from "conventional"
statements of law demands a greater showing of the third element, State practice,
than is generally required to prove such a rule.23 As the I.C.J. expounded in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily,
or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including
that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.24
18. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 9-10.
19. North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 41-43.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the brevity of a practice's existence is not a bar to the I.C.J. finding a
rule of customary international law, but may be supplemented by greater
uniformity in State practice than normally required. Brownlie observes that
"[p]rovided the consistency and generality of a practice are proved, no particular
duration is required: the passage of time will of course be a part of the evidence of
generality and consistency.
' 25
The framework provided in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case for the
development of a rule of customary international law from conventional sources is
of particular relevance to discussing the emergence of such a rule from U.N.
resolutions, which arguably serve as conventional sources.2 6 In the context of the
proposed rule, an analysis will demonstrate that the norm-creating character of the
resolutions and uniformity of state practice strongly evidence the rule and trump
any concerns surrounding the brevity of the rule's existence.
However, because many would debate that General Assembly or non-Chapter
VII resolutions have any legal effect, it must first be demonstrated that it is
appropriate to use such resolutions as a conventional source of customary
international law. The next section will extract principles from the I.C.J.'s
jurisprudence on the use of resolutions to strengthen the argument that U.N.
resolutions may be considered a "conventional" source to which the North Sea
framework applies and from which a customary rule of law may be derived.
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS IN THE I.C.J.'S
JURISPRUDENCE
Some international legal scholars would dispute labeling U.N. Resolutions as
a "conventional" source, since such label places them in the same category as
international agreements, and thus imputes legal value to resolutions.27 A number
of scholars subscribe to the view that resolutions of the United Nations have little
or no legal weight and are highly skeptical of any position that puts emphasis on
the legal effect of resolutions.2 8 As a general observation, this proposition is
probably true. Formally, the United Nations Charter regards U.N. General
Assembly resolutions as being "recommendations. 29  Moreover, the General
Assembly is not an official legislature in the ordinary sense that is associated with
25. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 7.
26. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations the System
of the Sources of International Law: With an Appendix on the Concept of International Law and the
Theory of International Organisation 9 (1979).
27. Id.
28. For example, Professor David J. Bederman argues that suggestions that "the resolutions of
United Nations bodies (particularly the General Assembly, where each nation has a vote) constitute a
binding source of international law are extravagant." DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS, 44 (2d ed., Foundation Press 2006) (2001) [hereinafter BEDERMAN].
29. The U.N. Charter employs the language of "recommend" in referring to the powers and
functions of the General Assembly. Charter of the United Nations art. 10-11, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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political discourse in particular national settings and the resolutions of the Security
Council bind the members only when speaking under enumerated powers.
30
Despite such criticism, resolutions of both the United Nations' General
Assembly and Security Council are often relied upon as evidence of customary
international law both internationally 31 and domestically.32 The International Law
Commission13 in an early report to the U.N. concluded that customary international
law could be derived from the cumulative practice of international organizations,
likely having applicability to U.N. Resolutions.34 More recently, several scholars
have emphasized the importance of resolutions to the rapid development of a rule
of custom, advising that "[m]odern custom can develop quickly because it is
deduced from multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such as the
General Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize emerging
customs, and generate new customs. ' '35 This statement resonates with those of U.S.
Courts such as in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,36 where the 9th
Circuit confirmed that "a resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations... is a powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international
law."37 The advantages of relying on resolutions as a source of custom, as has
30. See Lara M. Pair, Judicial Activism in the ICJ Charter Interpretation, 8 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 181, 189 (2001).
31. Arbitral Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company /
California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 28
(1978); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (separate opinion
of Judge Ago); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1980); Almog et al. v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 279-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying upon G.A. Res. 1566 as evidence of a
customary international law rule against terrorist acts); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.. . is
a powerful and authoritative statement of the customary international law of human rights"); Bodner v.
Banque-Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d
248, 255 (D.N.J. 1999).
33. The work of the Commission is a source of law under the I.C.J. Statute. I.C.J. Statute, supra
note 11, art. 38(1)(d) (stating that "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" are a subsidiary
source of international law).
34. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report To The General Assembly On Ways And Means For Making The
Evidence Of Customary International Law More Readily Available, A/CN.4/6 (June 1, 1949) (noting
that records of the cumulating practice of international organizations may be regarded as evidence of
customary international law with reference to States' relations to the organizations) available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4_6.pdf.
35. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001), relying, in part, on Eduardo Jim~nez de
Ar~chaga, Remarks, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 48 (Antonio Cassese
& Joseph H. H. Weiler eds., 1988) [hereinafter Roberts]. See also Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 544 (1993) ("Today, major developments in international
law often get their start of substantial support from proposals, reports, resolutions, treaties or protocols
debated in such forums . Sometimes these efforts result in consensus on solving the problem and
express it in normative terms of general application.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter Charney].
36. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d 699.
37. Id. at 719.
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been observed, is that the method "is potentially more democratic [than looking to
other sources] because it involves practically all States. 38
Consistently, the International Court of Justice has affirmed that General
Assembly resolutions and non-Chapter-VII resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council have legal significance under certain circumstances. For
instance, in the Construction of A Wall Advisory Opinion,39 the I.C.J. included
"relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the U.N. Charter by the General
Assembly and the Security Council" among the "rules and principles of
international law" which were useful in assessing the legality of the measures
taken by Israel.4° In various cases, therefore, the International Court of Justice has
employed resolutions of the General Assembly and non-Chapter-VII Security
Council resolutions not only as material sources of international law but, more
importantly, in providing norms for resolution of international disputes, especially
in the context of surveying and establishing the development of a rule of
customary international law.
To the extent the I.C.J.'s jurisprudence is relevant to establishing a norm of
customary international law from various resolutions of the General Assembly and
Security Council, this discussion is narrowly focused on the purposes for which
resolutions have been invoked by the Court. The three primary purposes for which
resolutions have been used - those that are relevant to our analysis - are: (i) as
indicative of a State's subscription to or pledge to abide by the norm embodied in
the relevant resolution; (ii) as evidence of the ongoing practices of States; and (iii)
as proofofopiniojuris. Each of these uses will be discussed in turn.
A. State's Votes on Resolutions as Subscription to the Embodied Norm
As to the first purpose, the I.C.J. has indicated that States must be careful in
voting for resolutions, as such votes evince a pledge to uphold the resolution's
embodied norn and may be legally binding against the States if a later controversy
arises.41 For example, in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea
Intervening),42 the Court was called upon to resolve a dispute concerning the
delimitation of the boundary between the States and Cameroon's sovereignty over
the Bakassi Peninsula. Resorting to a resolution of the General Assembly, the
Court observed that "this frontier line was acknowledged by Nigeria when it voted
in favour of General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV)., 43  Nigeria's
acknowledgment by voting in favor of the resolution had therefore become binding
upon it as a legal recognition of Cameroon title to the disputed territory, and the
38. Roberts, supra note 35, at 768.
39. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
40. Id. at 171.
41. See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.;
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Court held that "[n]o Nigerian efectivit~s in Bakassi before that time can be said to
have legal significance for demonstrating a Nigerian title. 44
The Court's opinion in the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon
and Nigeria case indicates that any State which votes in favor of the United
Nations resolutions must be aware that its vote indicates both that it agrees with the
norm that the Assembly, as a whole, subscribes to in that resolution and also that it
cannot be allowed by the Court to repent of its position if a matter is raised against
it by another State and that resolution is invoked.45 Further, this principle would
likely extend not only to resolutions of the General Assembly, but also non-
Chapter-VII Security Council resolutions as well for States which hold or have
held a position on the Council.
B. Resolutions as Evidence of Ongoing State Practice
The second purpose for which resolutions have been used is as evidence. To
successfully demonstrate the existence of a State practice for the purpose of
proving a rule of customary law, a court needs evidence, and one way to adduce
such evidence may be to rely upon a long string of resolutions on a particular
topic. 46 Not surprisingly, therefore, the I.C.J. has placed considerable reliance on
resolutions of the General Assembly for this purpose.
For instance, in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo,4 7 the I.C.J. used United Nations resolutions liberally for evidentiary
purposes. Both parties presented to the Court various resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council.48  Many of the resolutions invoked were not
promulgated under Chapter-VII of the U.N. Charter and would not be considered
legally binding, such as resolution 1234,49 which called for an immediate signing
of the ceasefire agreement.
In rejecting Uganda's self-defense excuse for the use of force in the Congo,
without discriminating between "Chapter-VII" and "non-Chapter-VII" resolutions,
44. Id. at 416.
45. Some commentators would remark that votes in organizations like the U.N. General Assembly
are "political" and therefore non-binding in any legal sense. See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Voting in
International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 589 (1980) ("Formal votes, when taken,
are often taken for a political purpose ... ; they may attempt to set norms for States to follow, but they
do not legally bind the organization or its members to carry out specific activities ... The U.N. General
Assembly is the clearest example... "); Damir Amaut, When in Rome ... ? The International Criminal
Court and Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 581 n.258 ("[T]he history of General
Assembly resolutions may be understood to demonstrate that they are often based on purely political
considerations "). Such categorization may be applicable to votes which are simultaneously
accompanied by State declarations that such votes are considered political. See, e.g., infra note 62. It
does not address the circumstance where a simultaneous declaration of that purpose is absent, nor the
weight given votes in I.C.J. jurisprudence, to the extent it is critical of General Assembly votes as a
whole.
46. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 1, 128-29 (Dec. 19).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. S.C. Res. 1234, U.N. DOc. S/RES/1234 (Apr. 9, 1999).
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the Court referred to what it respectfully recognized as being the "long series" of
U.N. Security council resolutions 50 which "testif[ied] to the magnitude of the
military events and the attendant suffering., 51 The series cited by the Court was
composed not only of resolutions passed both under Chapter-VII and non-Chapter-
VII powers of the Council, but in fact consisted of a majority of non-binding, non-
Chapter-VII resolutions. 52  The Court further relied on resolution 130453 for
evidence showing that a "loss of civilian lives.., and damage to property inflicted
by the forces of Uganda" were present and for the observation that the United
Nations Security Council had "identified Uganda and Rwanda as having violated
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo and as being under the
obligation to withdraw their forces. 54 Indeed, the Court went on to cite even U.N
General Assembly resolutions. 55 For example, in deciding the issue of whether or
not any armed attack took place on Uganda emanating from the Congo, the Court
relied on Article 3(6) of General Assembly resolution 331456 for the definition of
aggression.
57
Based upon the Court's practices, embodied in Congo, the Court's reliance on
the United Nations resolutions as evidence of a State practice is a natural extension
of the evidentiary function of resolutions. The Court's employment of non-binding
resolutions in an evidentiary context indicates how seriously the Court takes those
resolutions as evidence of State action and, it can also be assumed, of State
practice.
C. Resolutions as Providing Necessary Opinio Juris
Finally and most importantly, the Court has also looked to resolutions to
provide a declaratory basis of the opinio juris element for a rule of customary
international law. Thus, in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
58Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), speaking to a
circumstance where it had been argued that a rule of customary international law
existed, the Court considered whether an opinio juris existed as to the binding
character of the purported obligation. The Court remarked:
This opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from,
inter alia, the attitude of the parties and the attitude of States toward
certain General Assembly resolutions.... The effect of consent to the
text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a
"reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty commitment undertaken in the
Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the
50. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 54.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 54.
53. S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 304 (June 16, 2000).
54. ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 67, 43.
55. See id. at 15, 53.
56. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974).
57. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 53.
58. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by
themselves.
59
In other words, the I.C.J. could derive the requisite opiniojuris from a careful
analysis of the resolution in order to determine States' attitudes towards the rule
embodied.
The Court further found that, with regard to the United States, that the weight
of an expression of opinio juris could be attached to its support of the resolution of
the United Nations on the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with
the Charter of the U.N.60 According to the I.C.J., the adoption by States of this text
afforded an indication of their opinio juris as to the customary international law on
the question. 61 The Court cautioned that multiplicity of resolutions is not, without
more, sufficient to establish a rule of customary international law, as it still
depends upon the "exact content of the principle accepted" and whether "[State]
practice [is] sufficiently in conformity with it" for a rule of C.I.L. to exist.62 The
I.C.J. also indicated that if a State expressly mentions, while voting for a particular
resolution, that it regards the resolution as being merely a political statement
without legal content, then that resolution may not be invoked against it. 63 Despite
these qualifications, the I.C.J. gave G.A. resolutions a prominent place for their
ability to demonstrate opinio juris.64
Further, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon Advisory
Opinion, the Court expanded upon its statement in the Nicaragua Case, examining
General Assembly resolutions to determine whether or not such resolutions
provided the necessary opinio juris for the Court to find a rule of customary
international law.65 The issue arose as some States argued that "the important
series of General Assembly resolutions, beginning with resolution 1653 (XVI) of
24 November 1961,66 that deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with
consistent regularity, the illegality of nuclear weapons, signify the existence of a
rule of international customary law which prohibits recourse to those weapons. 6 7
According to other States, the resolutions in question had "no binding character on
their own account" and were not "declaratory of any customary rule of prohibition
59. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 100; see generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 101.
62. Id. at 107-08.
63. Id. at 106-07 (explaining that while the United States voted in favor of General Assembly
resolution 213 1 (XX), it also declared at the time of its adoption that it considered the declaration in that
resolution to be "only a statement of political intention and not a formulation of law." Resolution 2131
(XX) relates to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty).
64. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 15.
65. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(July 8).
66. See generally G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Nov. 24, 1961).
67. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 at 254.
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of nuclear weapons. ' '68 Additionally, opposing States pointed out that this series of
resolutions not only failed to muster the approval of all of the nuclear-weapon
States but of many other States as well.69 The I.C.J. responded to the issues raised
by stating that:
General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may
sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances,
provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or
the emergence of an opiniojuris. To establish whether this is true of a
given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content
and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an
opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of
resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required
for the establishment of a new rule.
70
The I.C.J. thus rejected the argument of some States that resolutions were
legally insignificant because of their non-binding character, giving resolutions the
power to establish opiniojuris depending upon their content and the conditions of
their adoption.
The Court went on to find that "[e]xamined in their totality, the General
Assembly resolutions put before the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons
would be 'a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations'; and in certain
formulations that such use 'should be prohibited. ' '' 7 1 However, the Court found
that "several of the resolutions under consideration in the present case [had] been
adopted with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; and thus,
although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem
of nuclear weapons, they still fall short of establishing the existence of an opinio
juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons., 72 Regardless of the outcome,
the clear import of the I.C.J.'s opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
73Weapons was to signal that, depending upon the level of State consensus,
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly can
establish the existence of requisite opiniojuris7 4
The Court confirmed this principle in the more recent Case Concerning the
Application on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
Against Genocide.75 Confronting a patently human rights issue, the Court relied on
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 254-55.
71. Id. at 255.
72. Id.
73. See discussion infra Section III.
74. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(July 8) (stating that the primary basis for the opinio juris as an ingredient of international customary
law is the Statute of the International Court of Justice itself which refers to "a general practice accepted
as law") (emphasis added); I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(b).
75. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Mont.), 46 I.L.M. 188, 142 (Feb. 26).
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several U.N. resolutions in conjunction with the Genocide Convention as a basis
for a customary international law rule that genocide is a crime. 76 The issue in the
case concerned whether any legal significance could be attached to the expression
"ethnic cleansing" in connection with the crime of genocide. 77  Within the
Genocide Convention, the term "ethnic cleansing" had no legal significance of its
own.78 However, the parties to the case submitted, among other sources, several
resolutions of the United Nations. 79 The Court resorted to the preamble of General
Assembly Resolution 47/121 which refers to ethnic cleansing as a "form of
genocide."80 Further, the Court referenced the "contemporaneous Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions condemning the killing of civilians in
connection with ethnic cleansing."
81
More importantly, the Court found that the affirmation that genocide was a
crime under international law, not only in Article I of the Genocide Convention but
also "read in conjunction with the declaration that genocide is a crime under
international law, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly two years earlier
in its resolution 96(I). ,,82 According to the Court, the "affirmation recognize[d] the
existing requirements of customary international law.... ,,83 In other words, this
declaration, which "purport[ed] to reflect legal principles," was considered an
expression of the necessary opinio juris for finding a rule of customary
international law.84
The proposal of the I.C.J. that resolutions may serve as the instrument for
finding customary international law is consistent with other evidence of
international opinion concerning the effect of non-binding resolutions in supplying
the necessary opiniojuris for a rule of customary international law. For example, a
memorandum of the United Nations' Office of Legal affairs has stated that:
[I]n view of the greater solemnity and significance of a 'declaration,' 85
it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a
76. Id. at 161.
77. Id. at 190.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 274.
80. Id. at 190 (noting that the Interim Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts had
referred to "ethnic cleansing" to mean "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area").
81. Id. at 274 (noting in particular Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), and General
Assembly Resolutions 48/153 (1993) and 49/196 (1994)).
82. Id. at 161.
83. Id.
84. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 12, § 102 note 2, cmt. c
(1987) (discussing how General Assembly resolutions have been held to express opiniojuris for rule of
customary international law).
85. "Declarations" are sometimes accorded greater weight than normal resolutions. See Noelle
Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal and Ethical
Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 537, 551 (1999) (noting "U.N.
declarations represent a form of action that is both psychological and political. The principles enshrined
in them can add leverage to claims for rights, especially claims emanating from non-governmental
organizations."); See also, Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of
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strong expectation that Members of the international community will
abide by it. Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually
justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.
86
The "strong expectation" such a declaratory resolution can create that "Members
of the international community will abide by it," 87 supports opinio juris by
evincing that the State practice in question is not coincidental, but is rather
"rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it." 88  The
Restatement 3rd of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 89 also accords with
this principle, confirming that "[r]esolutions of universal international
organizations, if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual
unanimity, are given substantial weight." 90
III. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESOLUTIONS SUPPORT OPINIO JURIS
Given that the I.C.J. has repeatedly affirmed that non-binding resolutions of
the United Nations can in fact support the opiniojuris element for finding a rule of
customary international law, discerning when and under what circumstances they
will be given that effect are important. The primary issues which arise are how to
assess the weight of resolutions and whether doubt should be cast on the legal
force of resolutions when States supporting such resolutions commit inconsistent
acts. Discussion of these problems will occur in light of both the I.C.J.'s own
decisions and other decisions of domestic and international tribunals.
A. Weighing the Force of Resolutions
A key issue that naturally arises is what conditions must be present to give a
resolution force as opinio juris. Such weight for resolutions of the General
Assembly varies depending upon the voting conditions surrounding the
resolutions. 91 The relevant conditions for analysis include not only the amount of
support but also the nature of support - whether the States voting for or against the
resolution represent a significant block of States which are much differently
situated than those in the opposing block.92 For example, in the dispute concerning
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and the Government of Libya, the arbitrator
considered it "important to note" that not only a majority of the assembly had
War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 110 n.485 (2000) ("The fact that a General Assembly Resolution
assumes for itself the term "Declaration" does highlight the importance of the document.").
86. Office of International Standards and Legal Affairs, General Introduction to the Standard-
Setting Instruments of UNESCO, Recommendations, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=23772&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html#4.
87. Id.
88. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
89. Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law is considered a subsidiary source of international
law under the I.C.J. Statute. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(1 )(d)..
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 12, §103 cmt. c (1987); see also
id. at §102 note 2 (discussing how General Assembly resolutions have been held to express opiniojuris
for rule of customary international law).
91. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. the Government of Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1,28 (1978).
92. Id.; see also Charney, supra note 35, at 544-45.
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voted for the text at hand, but also that the States voting in favor included both
"many States of the Third World, [and] also several Western developed countries
with market economies.... "9' The distinction between third world and developed
countries did not serve in itself as a standard of evaluation, but rather was
remarkable for its relevance to the particular controversy at hand - an economic
dispute crossing the divide of developed and third world economies.
Similarly, the U.S. District Court case of Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem.
Co.,94 the only domestic case available from the United States which has also
engaged in analysis of the legal weight to be given of a General Assembly
Resolutions for the purposes of establishing customary law, evaluated not only the
voting record but also the position of important players relative to the subject
matter of the resolution. Thus, although a particular resolution concerning the
military use of herbicides passed 80-3, the Court held that it did not evince
consensus on an issue, where two of the three States voting against the resolutions,
the United States, Australia, were among the world's larger military powers, and
such "no" votes were accompanied by 36 abstaining.95  Additionally, the
abstention of one-third of the countries was held to "deprive the resolution of even
precatory force" as it was demonstrative of a lack of consensus.96
In both of these decisions, the tribunals emphasize the same factors in
assessing their legal weight. Namely, they used the voting pattern relative to
whether a consensus is obtained (sometimes meaning a substantial majority or
near-unanimity97 and at other times described as a lack of express objections to the
heart of the norm the resolutions contemplate),98 the number of abstentions (which
in the eyes of some expresses tacit consent), 99 and the positions of key concerned
actors are assessed to determine whether a particular resolution is binding.
Although the I.C.J. itself has not directly addressed the topic, the I.C.J.'s refusal to
derive opinion juris from resolutions in Nuclear Weapons because of "substantial
numbers of negative votes and abstentions," ' '0 indicates that the Court would
follow this generally accepted methodology, in determining the weight of
reductions as providing opiniojuris.
93. Id.
94. Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp.
2d 7, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
95. Id. at 126.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., id. at 126 (noting "A General Assembly resolution, even though it is not binding,
may provide some evidence of customary international law when it is unanimous (or nearly so).").
98. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 35, at 544 ("unanimous support is not required... The absence
of objections, of course, amounts to tacit consent by participants that do not explicitly support the norm.
Even opposition by a small number of participating States may not stop the movement of the proposed
rule toward law... .
99. Id.
100. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 255
(July 8).
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B. Inconsistent Actions by States Supporting a Resolution
Some argue that no opinio juris can exist if States vote overwhelmingly in
support of particular resolutions but their conduct is inconsistent with their
words.0 1 The example given is that States voted overwhelmingly in the U.N.
General Assembly for resolutions condemning State-sponsored torture, yet some of
those States continued to engage in torture. 10 2 Could it, therefore, be said that no
customary norm prohibiting States from engaging in torture existed? The fact of
the matter is that the law against torture is actually a norm of customary
international law.'0 3 To ignore the words simply because they are at times not
accompanied by action would be to ignore an increasingly important source of
norms. A particular country's failure to keep its word does not necessarily mean
that it does not understand its verbal commitments to have legal effect.
The dispute is given a more than hypothetical character when put in context
of the I.C.J.'s jurisprudence on the issue. As previously stated in the discussion
above, 10 4 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening),1 °5
a country which votes in favor of a resolution may not altogether disregard what
their vote signifies and is, in some ways, bound by their vote. Therefore, scholars
who make the argument that the inconsistency of some States defeats the binding
nature of a resolution must confront the principle the Court referenced in
Cameroon.
IV. ANALYSIS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMAN-RIGHTS-RELATED
RESOLUTIONS
The resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council
concerning fighting terrorism in a manner consistent with human rights support the
finding of opinio juris based upon both their language and voting patterns. As an
analysis of the resolutions reveals, the language is of a strong, norm-creating
character. Moreover, voting patterns show consistent support of a majority of
States which cuts across both the Western democracies waging the "War on
Terror," many of whom have approved of the language in one or more resolution,
and the developing countries on the front lines. Additionally, the decisions of the
high courts of many States 10 6 have recognized the non-derogability of human rights
in fighting terrorism both apart from and in reference to resolutions of the U.N. in
that regard, establishing the requisite State practice and cementing the rule of
101. See BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at 45.
102. Id.
103. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 864, 882-84 (2d. Cir. 1980) (relying partially on General
Assembly resolutions to hold that torture violates the "law of nations"); BEDERMAN, supra note 28, at
45 (describing General Assembly resolutions as mere evidence of state practice and opiniojuris and not
enough alone to form an international legal obligation).
104. See supra Part Il.a.
105. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002
I.C.J. 303, 431 (Oct. 10).
106. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(d) (providing that decisions of national courts are
accorded force as subsidiary sources of international law).
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customary law which the resolutions embody. Thus, despite the brevity of this
rule's existence, first manifesting itself merely six years ago, the uniform
consensus on the norm alleviates the need for a "long" practice.
A. General Assembly Resolutions
The General Assembly Resolutions concerning the topic at issue are primarily
G.A. Res. 56/160, G.A. Res. 58/187, G.A. Res. 59/191, G.A. Res. 59/195, and
G.A. Res. 57/219. The language of these resolutions is consistent with the North
Sea Case requirement that a provision must be norm-creating. °7  As a very
forceful whole, the resolutions emphasize both the non-derogability of human
rights and the duty of states to comply. G.A. Res. 56/160 authorizes States to
"take all necessary and effective measures, in accordance with relevant provisions
of international law, including international human rights standards, to prevent,
combat and eliminate terrorism... and... strengthen, where appropriate, their
legislation to combat terrorism."' 0 8 Consistently, G.A. Res. 57/219 urges that
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with
their obligations under international law, in particular international human
rights."" '9 G.A. Res. 58/187 holds that certain human rights are "non-derogable"
and "[r]eaffirms that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in particular
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law." 10 The remaining two
resolutions, G.A. Res. 59/191".. and 59/195112 reaffirm and build off of the
principles contained in G.A. Res. 57/219.
Of the five resolutions at issue, two - G.A. Res. 59/191 and G.A. Res. 57/219
- were passed without a vote. Of the remainder, G.A. Res. 56/160, entitled
"Human Rights and Terrorism," passed unanimously, 102 votes to none, with
sixty-nine abstentions.1 3 Those in favor cover many of the nations in what might
be deemed the "front lines" on the War on Terror - those States that deal
domestically with the suppression of terrorism at its roots - Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Afghanistan among them. 1 4 Those abstaining, or in the words of one scholar,
expressing "tacit consent," ' 1 5 include many of the Western democracies waging the
107. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-42 (Feb. 20).
108. G.A. Res. 56/160, supra note 4, 6 (emphasis added).
109, G.A. Res. 57/219, supra note 4, I (emphasis added).
110. United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 58/187, Preamble 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/187 (Mar. 22, 2004).
111. G.A. Res. 59/191, supra note 4.
112. G.A. Res. 59/195, supra note 4.





mit-&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x=0&y=0#focus (last visited Nov. 25, 2008)
[hereinafter UNBISNET Vote 56/160].
114. Id.
115. Chamey, supra note 35, at 544.
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war, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France. 11 6 Moreover, in
the context of this particular resolution, it is inapposite to say that the abstentions
"deprive it" of its force, as Ngyuen Thang Loi phrased it,1 17 since the three
aforementioned States supported Security Council resolutions with a similar effect
(each State having veto powers as permanent members of the Security Council, the
resolutions would not have passed but for their votes), and further, the high courts
of two of the States have subsequently recognized the need to afford certain human
rights to suspected terrorists, as will be discussed below. One can only conclude
that the abstentions, rather than a statement of non-support, were for purposes
unrelated to the human rights language of the resolution.
Compared to G.A. Res. 56/160, States manifested even greater support for
G.A. Res. 58/187, passing the resolution not only unanimously, 181 votes to 0, but
with only one country abstaining. 1 8 The resolution is of particular importance not
only for affirming that even in the War on Terror, human rights must be upheld,
but also for placing such a statement within the context of the principle of non-
derogation.119 The effect of the resolution in giving rise to a rule of C.I.L. is
particularly forceful, having passed unanimously with only one abstention.
Moreover, the one country which abstained, India, voted in favor of both G.A. Res.
56/160 previously and G.A. Res. 59/195 subsequently and recognized in the
jurisprudence of its Supreme Court a year later1 20 that human rights deserve
protection even during the War on Terror.
121
Finally, G.A. Res. 59/195, creates additional support for arriving at our
proposed rule of customary international law. The resolution emphasized similar
desires as those stated in 59/191 and 57/219, strongly urging States to combat
terrorism "in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including
international human rights standards.1 22 The General Assembly cast 127 votes in
favor and 50 in opposition, with 8 abstentions.1 23 The resolution, receiving greater
116. UNBISNET Vote 56/160, supra note 113.
117. Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp.
2d 7, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).





mit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=&x=0&y=0#focus (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
119. G.A. Res. 58/187, supra note 110.
120. People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor v. Union of India, [2004] 1 L.R.I. 1, 17 (India),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com [hereinafter People's Union].
121. Id.
122. GA/RES/59/195, supra note 4.
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opposition than previous resolutions nevertheless received greater support than
56/160 as well, evincing a growing change in attitude of even those who originally
remained neutral.
B. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
In addition to the resolutions of the General Assembly that are addressed
above, many resolutions of the U.N Security Council touch on human rights while
combating terrorism. Those which directly embody the norm that the War on
Terror must comport with human rights standards, including resolutions 1456,
1535, and 1624, are non-Chapter VII resolutions, meaning they are not
immediately binding upon U.N. Member States.' 24 However, resolutions 1373 and
1566, both binding Chapter VII resolutions, are also of relevance to this discussion
for indirectly indicating the same norm - 1373 by requiring States to conform to
human rights while implementing security measures for their borders and 1566 by
broadly "reminding" States of their obligation to respect human rights.
The first counter-terrorism resolution to include the human rights language
was Security Council Resolution 1456 in January 2003.125 The importance of
resolution 1456 was twofold: it both stressed the general obligation of nations to
combat terrorism "in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law"'126 and also emphasized the more
specific obligation to accord terrorists due process rights, stating that States had an
obligation under the "principle to extradite or prosecute. 127
Additionally, Security Council resolution 1535 reiterated the State's
obligation to comply with human rights in combating terrorism. 128 In language
reminiscent of resolution 1456, the Council stated that "States... must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under
international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international
law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law."'
129
Shortly after the passage of 1535, the Security Council again addressed the
issue in Security Council resolution 1566,130 a binding Chapter-VII resolution. 3 '
Interestingly, resolution 1566 pairs the obligation of States to combat terrorism in
accordance with human rights with the concept that "acts of terrorism seriously
impair the enjoyment of human rights. '132 As will be discussed, this implication
124. See James A. R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security
Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 428
[hereinafter Nafziger & Wise]; see also Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action
and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency, 6 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 24, 102 [hereinafter Schott].
125. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003).
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. at 3.
128. S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 4; see also S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 4.
129. Id. at Preamble.
130. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4.
131. See Nafziger & Wise, supra note 124, at 428; see also Schott, supra note 124, at 102.
132. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4, at Preamble.
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formed the basis of decisions of at least two national courts in defending human
rights in the context of the War on Terror.
133
Lastly, Security Council resolution 1373,'134 also a binding Chapter-VII
resolution, passed shortly after the September 11 th attacks, is relevant to this
discussion for having affirmed the principle of acting in accordance with human
rights in the specific instance of dealing with refugees. Among a list of a number
of actions which the Council called upon the States to implement, the Council
called for States to "take appropriate measures in conformity with... international
standards of human rights..." to scrutinize refugees seeking asylum, ensuring
terrorists did not cross borders unsuspected. 35  The language of 1373 is
particularly important as it bound the States to implement counter-terrorism
measures, yet simultaneously required that human rights would receive priority in
considering what measures were "appropriate."'
136
Each of the foregoing Security Resolutions were adopted by a unanimous
council that permanently includes the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France - three of the Western States most involved in the War on Terror. 137 A
commonality exists in each of these resolutions of the Security Council: the non-
derogability of human rights in fighting terrorism. Moreover, these resolutions and
resolution 1566 in particular, give context to this rule that States respect human
rights in the War on Terror, explicating that terror itself is a violation of human
rights and, as such, counter-terrorism must not fall victim to the very failings of
terrorism. Taken as a unit and in combination with the long string of General
Assembly resolutions to the same effect, these Security Council resolutions
embody a forceful statement of the nations, evincing an opinio juris for the
proposed rule.
C. National Decisions Affirming Human Rights in Countering Terrorism
A uniform sense of legal obligation to protect human rights while countering
international terrorism is manifested in the decisions of the high courts of several
major world powers, including India, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the
United States. 38 Moreover, the practice of these particular States is of particular
importance to an emerging rule of customary international as these States are
among those at the forefront of the global War on Terror and two of these States
hold permanent positions on the U.N. Security Council. 139  From these Court
133. See, e.g., People's Union, supra note 120; R (on the application of A1-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State
for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58 (U.K.); see, also, discussion supra subsection IV(C).
134. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 4.
135. Id. at 3(f).
136. Id.
137. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 4;
S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 4; S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 4.
138. Decisions of national courts are accepted evidence of customary international law according to
the I.C.J. Statute, which recognizes "judicial decisions ... of the various nations.. as among the
"subsidiary sources" of international law. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 11, art. 38(l)(d).
139. U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 23, I;see U.S. Department of State, International
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decisions - some of which reference the statements by the U.N. in resolutions of
the General Assembly and Security Council and some of which do not - may be
inferred a State practice implementing the norm embodied in the resolutions
discussed above, not to derogate from human rights standards while fighting terror.
This practice strongly supports finding a customary rule of that nature as "[t]hose
solutions that [are] positively received by the international community through
State practice or other indications of support will rapidly be absorbed into
international law, notwithstanding the technical legal status of the form in which
they emerged from the multilateral forum."
' 140
1. India
The Supreme Court of India has acknowledged that the War on Terror must
be fought in a manner that upholds human rights, in a passage that is consistent
with the principles embodied in Security Council Resolutions 1535 and 1566 and
G.A. Resolution 57/219, in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor v
Union of India.14 1 Declaring that terrorism itself breeds the grossest violations of
human rights, the Court nevertheless emphasized:
The protection and promotion of human rights under the rule of law is
essential in the prevention of terrorism. Here comes the role of law and
court's responsibility. If human rights are violated in the process of
combating terrorism, it will be self-defeating. Terrorism often thrives
where human rights are violated, which adds to the need to strengthen
action to combat violations of human rights. The lack of hope for
justice provides breeding grounds for terrorism. [...] In all cases, the
fight against terrorism must be respectful to the human rights. 42
The opinion of the Supreme Court of India evinces the government's affirmation
of the desperate need to protect human rights even while bringing to justice those
individuals who would disregard such rights.
2. The United Kingdom
Similarly, the House of Lords of the United Kingdom in R (on the application
of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence,143 though not acting pursuant to a
specific U.N. resolution, adhered to the principles embodied in those resolutions.
The defendant in Al Jedda was suspected for smuggling weapons for terrorist acts
and complained that he had been held indefinitely, though he had not been charged
with any offense. 44 The Court attested to the emerging norm requiring that terror
be fought consistent with human rights, recognizing that "[o]n repeated occasions
Contributions to the War Against Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm (last
visited Nov. 25, 2008).
140. Chamey, supra note 35, at 545.
141. People's Union, supra note 120, at 17.
142. Id. at 17.
143. See generally R (in re Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1
A.C. 332 (H.L. 2007) (appeal taken from Q.B.), available at 2007 WL 4266094 (HL).
144. The Queen (in re Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, 1-2,
Q.B.D., available at 2005 WL 2003226 (DC).
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in recent years the U.N. and other international bodies have stressed the need for
effective action against the scourge of terrorism but have, in the same breath,
stressed the imperative need for such action to be consistent with international
human rights standards.... 145 The House of Lords therefore held that though a
particular U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1546) granted the UK the
power to detain, such grant was still not authority to derogate from human rights
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
146
In many other cases as well, the House of Lords has upheld human rights
standards in the context of counter-terrorism measures. Particularly relevant
decisions of the House include R (A) v Secretary of State,147 declaring the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torturing suspected terrorists as a violation
of abuse of process and the right to a fair trial, 148 and R (Gillan & Anor) v
Commission of Police of the Metropolis,149 holding that extraordinary search
powers were not available for the prevention of terrorist acts. Furthermore, in R
(Abassi & Anor) v Secretary of State,15 an unusual opinion concerning a UK
citizen who was a detainee in the United States' territory of Guantanamo Bay, the
House remarked that it was objectionable to the common law idea of habeas
corpus that a suspected terrorist "should be subject to indefinite detention... with
no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his detention before any court or
tribunal.,' 15' The opinion can be understood as a message from the U.K. to the
U.S., disapproving of the United States' practice of disregarding habeas corpus,
even in regards to suspected terrorists, as lacking conformity with human rights.
52
3. Australia
In a 2007 opinion, Thomas v. Mobray, the High Court of Australia upheld the
ight of an acknowledged member of a terrorist organization to be free from certain
restrictions on his liberty, striking down a law which had the stated purpose of
"allow[ing] obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on a person by
a control order for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act.' 53 In
the face of the defendant's admitted connections to a terrorist organization, the
Court held that international law "ratified by and binding on Australia, protects the
rights of individuals to be free of arbitrary detention and the unlawful deprivation
of liberty.' 54
145. Id. at 354, [ 37.
146. Id. at 354-55, 39.
147. See generally A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68,
(H.L. 2004) (appeal taken from Q.B.), available at 2004 WL 2810935 (HL).
148. Id. at 97.
149. R (Gillan and another) v. Comm'r of Police of the Metropolis and another [2006] UKHL 12,
[2006] 2 A.C. 307 (U.K.).
150. R (In re Abbasi and another) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and
another [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [2002] All ER. (D) 70 (Eng.).
151. Id. at 66.
152. Rodney C. Austin, The New Constitutionalism, Terrorism, and Torture, 60 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 2007 79, 99 (Colm O'Cinneide & Jane Holder eds., 2007).
153. Thomas v. Mowbray and Others (2007) 237 A.L.R. 194, 170 (Austl.) (Kirby, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 379.
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4. The United States
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in the cases of Rasul v. Bush,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, has provided that the suspected
terrorists are entitled to certain basic due process rights. 155 In Rasul v. Bush, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that detainees of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay
have the right to petition for habeas corpus, to have a judicial determination of the
constitutionality of their detention. 56 Additionally, the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
decided simultaneously with Rasul, recognized the rights of suspected terrorists to
limited Due Process, including the right to "a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for [their] detention before a neutral decision-maker. 1 57 More
recently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court struck down the use of military
tribunals by the U.S. during the prosecution of terrorists as being inconsistent with
the procedural rights owed to the defendants in such cases. 58
5. What Follows
The consistent practice of the high courts of these particularly important
States is demonstrative of opinio juris regarding the obligation to protect
international human rights while countering international terrorism. In many of the
decisions mentioned, references were made to international law in the reasoning of
the opinions. Additionally, both People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anor and R
(on the application of Al- Jedda), specifically mentioned the persuasive force of
U.N. resolutions on the key issue of the respective cases. From these decisions, it
is clear that the States' ready acquiescence in admitting that countering terrorism
must still remain consistent with human rights is "rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.",
159
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the failure of nations to come to agreement as to what constitutes
"terrorism," a customary rule has emerged which places on States a positive
obligation to respect human rights in taking counter-terrorism measures. This rule
has its foundation in the long string of both General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions enunciating the rule and in the practice of States, evinced in
decisions of their High Courts, which confirms that such rule is obligatory. In
consideration of such a rule, States must be aware that violations of human rights
in the context of counter-terrorism will not be lawful, regardless of whether they
have acceded to human rights treaties. Of further consequence, States are on
notice that the rule renders them responsible to the international community for
violations.
155. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577 (2007); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004).
156. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
157. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
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2009

